Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC supplied Pavestone, LLC with aggregate used to manufacture pavers. After customers complained about efflorescence on the pavers, Pavestone determined that sodium carbonate in Hi-Tech’s aggregate caused the issue. Pavestone sued Hi-Tech for negligence, products liability, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court ruled in favor of Pavestone on the breach of warranty and products liability claims.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and found that Hi-Tech breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and was liable under products liability. Hi-Tech appealed the decision, arguing that it did not know of Pavestone’s specific need for sodium-free aggregate and that the economic loss doctrine barred Pavestone’s tort claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that Hi-Tech’s sale of aggregate carried an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because Hi-Tech had reason to know Pavestone’s intended use. The court adopted the reasoning of UCC § 2-315, which does not require proof of a seller’s actual knowledge if the seller had reason to know the product’s intended purpose. The court also held that Pavestone was excused from testing the aggregate for sodium carbonate because the defect was latent and not detectable through a simple examination.However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on the products liability claim, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Pavestone’s noncontractual claims. The doctrine applies when the damage is to the product itself and not to other property. Pavestone did not provide sufficient evidence of damage to property other than the pavers. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s judgment on the warranty claim but reversed its judgment on the products liability claims. View "Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC v. Pavestone, LLC" on Justia Law

Lavonne S. Mottern died after receiving a contaminated intravenous injection at Princeton Medical Center, operated by Baptist Health System, Inc. (BHS). Donald J. Mottern, as administrator of Lavonne's estate, filed claims against BHS, Meds I.V., LLC (the manufacturer of the injection), and three individuals associated with Meds I.V. The claims against Meds I.V. and the individuals were settled, leaving only the claims against BHS, which included negligence, wantonness, a claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD), and a breach of implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed all of Mottern's claims against BHS, including the negligence and wantonness claims, which BHS conceded should not have been dismissed. BHS argued that the AEMLD and UCC claims were subject to the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA) and required proof of a breach of the standard of care. The trial court agreed and dismissed these claims, leading to Mottern's appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and agreed with BHS that all of Mottern's claims, including those under the AEMLD and UCC, are subject to the AMLA's standard-of-care provisions. The court held that the AMLA applies to all actions for medical injury, regardless of the theory of liability, and requires proof of a breach of the standard of care. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the negligence and wantonness claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The main holding is that the AMLA's standard-of-care provisions apply to all claims alleging medical injury, including those under the AEMLD and UCC. View "Mottern v. Baptist Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals considered an indemnification case between Nissan, an automobile manufacturer, and Continental, a brake parts supplier. Nissan sought indemnification from Continental for a $24 million jury award and $6 million in attorney fees and costs resulting from a products liability lawsuit in California. The lawsuit arose after an accident involving a Nissan vehicle, with the jury finding that the design of the vehicle’s braking system caused harm to the plaintiffs. Nissan argued that a provision in their contract with Continental obligated Continental to indemnify them for the jury award and litigation costs. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the contract required Nissan to show that a defect in a Continental-supplied part caused the injury, which Nissan failed to do. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Continental. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, the plaintiffs were the children of Robert Crum Jr., who was killed when the concrete truck he was driving overturned due to a tire failure. The tire was a 10-year-old Hankook AH10 tire, and the plaintiffs sued the companies that allegedly designed, manufactured, and distributed the tire, Hankook Tire America Corporation and Hankook Tire & Technology Co., Ltd. ("Hankook"). The plaintiffs alleged that the tire was defective and caused the accident. They sought to depose Hankook's designated corporate representative, Won Yong Choi, and claimed that he provided evasive answers or did not answer at all. They also alleged that Hankook's attorney consistently interrupted the deposition, objected to questions, and instructed Choi not to answer. As a result, the plaintiffs moved the trial court to impose sanctions against Hankook.The trial court granted the motion and imposed sanctions that included prohibiting Hankook from having any corporate representative give testimony at trial that went beyond Choi's deposition testimony, barring Hankook from disputing at trial that the failed tire was defective, and striking 10 of Hankook's affirmative defenses. The trial court also ordered the plaintiffs to submit evidence of the attorneys' fees and costs they had incurred in preparing for and taking Choi's deposition. After they did so, the trial court entered an order awarding the plaintiffs $66,550 in attorneys' fees.Hankook petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, asking the court to direct the trial court to vacate the sanctions order and the fee order. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were not authorized by Rule 37(d) because Choi did not fail to appear for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to vacate both its initial order sanctioning Hankook and its later order imposing a monetary sanction. View "Ex parte Hankook Tire America Corporation PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals as to the applicability of the economic loss doctrine in this case, holding that the economic loss doctrine applies only in products liability cases and should not be expanded to apply outside the products liability context.In the underlying suit brought by a drywall subcontractor against a general contractor under theories of breach of contract and tort a jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to the subcontractor. The court of appeals affirmed in part the award of compensatory damages for breach of contract, dismissed the tort claim, and reversed the award for punitive damages, holding that the economic loss doctrine applied outside the products liability context when the contract was negotiated between sophisticated commercial entities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the economic loss doctrine only applies in products liability cases and should not be extended to other claims; and (2) the economic loss doctrine did not bar the subcontractor's recovery of compensatory and punitive damages based on its tort claim. View "Commercial Painting Co. v. Weitz Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose from personal injuries Adrian Carillo Alcala (“Carillo”) suffered at a potato packaging plant, SunRiver of Idaho, Inc. (“SunRiver”), after his head and shoulders were crushed by a box palletizer designed, manufactured, delivered, and installed by a Dutch company, Verbruggen Emmeloord, B.V. (“VE”), along with its United States affiliate, Verbruggen Palletizing Solutions, Inc. (“VPS”). The box palletizer was one of seven machines SunRiver purchased in a transaction with Volm Companies, Inc. (“Volm”). Because this was a workplace injury, Carillo received worker’s compensation benefits through his employers, SunRiver, Employers Resource Management Company, and Employers Resource of America, Inc.—and the surety American Zurich Insurance Company (collectively “the SunRiver Plaintiffs”). Afterwards, the SunRiver Plaintiffs jointly with, and in the name of Carillo, sued Volm, VE, and VPS. Pursuant to a stipulation and compromise agreement, Volm was dismissed from this suit before this appeal. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents and dismissed all claims after concluding that VE and VPS were Carillo’s statutory co-employees immune from common law liability under Richardson v. Z & H Construction, LLC, 470 P.3d 1154 (2020). On appeal, the SunRiver Plaintiffs and Carillo argued that the transaction between SunRiver and Volm did not make Carillo, VE, and VPS statutory co-employees because it was a “hybrid” transaction consisting of goods with incidental services under Kelly v. TRC Fabrication, LLC, 487 P.3d 723 (2021). VE and VPS cross-appealed the district court’s denial of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the SunRiver Plaintiffs and Carillo. VE and VPS were “third parties” and were not entitled to immunity from suit in tort under the Worker’s Compensation law. The district court’s judgment dismissing all claims was vacated, the grant of summary judgment to VE and VPS was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court also rejected VE’s and VPS’s argument that the SunRiver Plaintiffs’ subrogation interest was barred at summary judgment. The Court found evidence in the record sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact over whether the SunRiver Plaintiffs had any comparative fault for Carillo’s accident. As for the cross-appeal, the Court vacated the district court’s decision denying attorney fees under section 12-120(3) below because there was not yet a prevailing party. View "Alcala v. Verbruggen Palletizing Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The National Advertising Division (“NAD”), a self-regulatory organization, concluded that Defendant Young Living Essential Oils, LC’s (“Young Living”) claims that its oils are “therapeutic-grade” and impart physical and/or mental health benefits are “unsupported,” and recommended that Young Living stop making these claims. Plaintiff had already spent money on Young Living’s products, including lavender oil advertised to “promote [a] feeling of calm and fight occasional nervous tension” and peppermint oil that allegedly “helps to  maintain energy levels.” Feeling misled by claims that the products would have effects like “promoting feelings of relaxation & tranquility,” Plaintiff sued, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals, asserting claims under common law and various state statutes that she believes protect consumers like her against companies like Young Living. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit, finding that Young Living’s claims that its products would do things like “help to maintain energy levels” was run-of-the-mill puffery that companies use when trying to persuade potential customers to part with their dollars.   The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court vacated the district court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed the New York General Business Law claims for being based on statements of non-actionable puffery and the unjust enrichment claim for not satisfying the Rule 9(b) requirement. The court affirmed the ruling as to the dismissal of the breach of warranty claims. The court found that Plaintiff’s stated the circumstances constituting fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) and certainly with enough particularity to give fair notice of her claim and enable the preparation of a defense. View "MacNaughton v. Young Living Essential Oils, LC" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified two questions of law for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's consideration. Plaintiffs, individuals who presently or formerly lived in the Merrimack area, brought tort claims, including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and negligent failure to warn, alleging that defendants’ manufacturing process at its facility in the Town of Merrimack used chemicals that included perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA). They alleged PFOA was a toxic chemical that was released into the air from the Merrimack facility and has contaminated the air, ground, and water in Merrimack and nearby towns. As a result, plaintiffs alleged the wells and other drinking water sources in those places were contaminated, exposing them to PFOA, placing them at risk of developing health problems, including testicular cancer, kidney cancer, immunotoxicity, thyroid disease, high cholesterol, ulcerative colitis, and pregnancy induced hypertension. The first question from the federal circuit court asked whether New Hampshire recognized “a claim for the costs of medical monitoring as a remedy or as a cause of action” in plaintiffs' context. Depending on the answer to the first question, the second question asked, “what are the requirements and elements of a remedy or cause of action for medical monitoring” under New Hampshire law. Because the Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, it did not address the second question. View "Brown, et al. v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

A transportation company, Wasatch Transportation, Inc., needed three buses to comply with a state contract. Compliance required "particularly durable buses" because the routes would exceed 350 miles in inclement weather with substantial changes in elevation. Wasatch bought Synergy buses from the manufacturer, Forest River, Inc., based on assurances from a Forest River sales personnel that the buses were “[q]uality buses” that Forest River “would take really good care of” and would “be amazing when they were done.” For each bus, Forest River provided a warranty packet containing three limitations: (1) the warranty covered only repair costs; (2) the warranty was exclusive, taking the place of other possible warranties; and (3) the warranty provided the buyer’s only remedy for defects under any legal theory. After the purchase, the buses developed mechanical problems. Even after the bus was repaired, it continued to break down. Another bus broke down soon after the purchase and was usable only a third of the next year. Given the breakdowns, Wasatch allegedly had to buy another bus to comply with the state contract; but the state cancelled the contract anyway. Wasatch thereafter sued Forest River for: breach of an express warranty; breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to Forest River, reasoning that its warranty packet prevented any relief. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined there were genuine issues of material fact to preclude the district court's grant of summary judgment. That judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Wasatch Transportation v. Forest River" on Justia Law

Defendants were California residents who served in various capacities as officers or directors of JUUL Labs, Inc. (“JUUL”), an e-cigarette manufacturer, or its predecessor companies. The State of Colorado filed an amended complaint alleging that defendants in their individual capacities, along with JUUL as a corporation, violated several provisions of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) and were subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Defendants contended the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them was improper because they lacked the requisite minimum contacts with Colorado and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them was unreasonable under the circumstances. JUUL did not argue that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because: (1) the district court based its determination on allegations directed against JUUL and the group of defendants as a whole, rather than on an individualized assessment of each defendant’s actions; and (2) the State did not allege sufficient facts to establish either that defendants were primary participants in wrongful conduct that they purposefully directed at Colorado, or that the injuries alleged in the amended complaint arose out of or related to defendants’ Colorado-directed activities, the district court erred in finding that the State had made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in this matter. View "In re State of Colorado v. Juul Labs, Inc." on Justia Law