Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

A mother brought suit on behalf of herself and her minor son, alleging that the son developed leukemia after attending school near and residing close to a manufacturing plant operated by General Electric Company. The plant, located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, produced electrical transformers and capacitors containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) for decades. The plaintiff claimed that GE’s use, disposal, and storage of PCBs caused the son’s illness, and sought recovery under various legal theories, including strict liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, nuisance, improper transportation of hazardous material, and loss of consortium. The complaint included claims related to the defective design and use of PCB materials, as well as their disposal and remediation.The plaintiff originally filed suit in Massachusetts state superior court. GE removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), based on its wartime production of PCB-containing devices for the federal government and its later remediation efforts pursuant to a consent decree with the EPA. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that GE failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal. The district court agreed, ordered remand, and stayed that order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. It held that GE satisfied both the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of the federal officer removal statute, due to its extensive work producing PCB-containing devices for the federal government. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether GE has a colorable federal defense. View "Czerno v. General Electric Company" on Justia Law

A group of parents, guardians, and children alleged that prenatal exposure to acetaminophen, the active ingredient in Tylenol and similar over-the-counter drugs, caused attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and/or autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in children. The defendants were manufacturers, pharmacies, and retailers of acetaminophen products. The plaintiffs’ claims centered on the companies’ alleged failure to warn about the risk of these neurodevelopmental disorders associated with prenatal acetaminophen use.These cases were consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In the Rutledge action, the district court excluded all five of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses on general causation, concluding their methodologies were unreliable, and granted summary judgment to defendants. In the Phippen action, which involved only ADHD claims, the district court excluded another expert, Dr. Ness, and again granted summary judgment to defendants. The district court also rejected defendants’ arguments that federal drug labeling law preempted the plaintiffs’ claims, holding that federal law did not bar additional, specific pregnancy-related warnings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly exercised its gatekeeping role under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in excluding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony. The Second Circuit held that the district court exceeded its discretion in excluding the testimony of Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, and Pearson, because their methodologies were consistent with those generally accepted in their fields and their reasoning was within the range of scientific debate. The appellate court affirmed the exclusion of testimony from Drs. Cabrera and Louie. In light of its rulings, the Second Circuit vacated the summary judgments, remanded both cases for further proceedings, and directed reconsideration of Dr. Ness’s exclusion in Phippen. The court also affirmed that federal law did not preempt the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims. View "Rutledge v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Shawn and Tanya Maywald were injured in a collision when a northbound driver fell asleep and crossed into their lane, striking their vehicle. The vehicle that caused the crash was a 2019 Toyota 4Runner, which lacked a lane departure warning (LDW) system. The Maywalds alleged that the absence of LDW rendered the 4Runner defective and unreasonably dangerous, and they sued Toyota and others for strict product liability, negligent design, and loss of consortium.The Superior Court in Navajo County granted summary judgment for Toyota, finding that the 4Runner was not defective or unreasonably dangerous and that the absence of LDW did not cause the accident. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated that decision, holding that the Maywalds had presented sufficient evidence for their strict product liability claim to proceed. The appellate court found that the risk/benefit analysis for strict liability could consider alternative designs and that there were factual disputes regarding negligence and causation; it reinstated all of the Maywalds’ claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the requirements for strict product liability. The court held that a plaintiff must independently prove both that a product was defective and that the defect rendered it unreasonably dangerous. The court further clarified that the risk/benefit analysis must focus on the risks and benefits of the product as actually designed, not as compared to an alternative design. Applying this framework, the court concluded that the absence of LDW did not make the 4Runner defective for its ordinary use, so the Maywalds’ strict liability, negligent design, and derivative loss of consortium claims could not proceed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for Toyota. View "MAYWALD v. TOYOTA" on Justia Law

Monsanto Company manufactures Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has repeatedly evaluated glyphosate and concluded it is not likely to cause cancer, and as a result, EPA has not required a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. John Durnell used Roundup for about 20 years and developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. He sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, asserting a failure-to-warn claim, arguing that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label.A jury in the Missouri trial court found in Durnell’s favor on the failure-to-warn claim and awarded him more than $1 million in damages. Monsanto argued that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempted the state-law failure-to-warn claim because it would require labeling different from what the EPA mandates. The Missouri trial court rejected this argument, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Missouri’s failure-to-warn requirements were consistent with FIFRA’s misbranding provisions.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim. The Court reasoned that EPA’s approval of Roundup’s label—without a cancer warning—constitutes a federal labeling requirement. Because FIFRA’s preemption clause prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements “in addition to or different from” federal requirements, Missouri’s requirement for a cancer warning is preempted. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Monsanto v. Durnell" on Justia Law

A maintenance worker was injured when a small derrick tipped over during work on a defective transformer. Two years after the incident, the injured individual and his spouse filed suit against the derrick’s manufacturer and several corporate entities that leased the equipment to the worker’s employer. The complaint was filed on the last day permitted by the Texas statute of limitations. Plaintiffs received service citations the next day, and forwarded them to a process server three days later. Service was completed about fifty days after filing, with delays attributed to confusion over defendants’ identities and addresses, as well as disruptions caused by a courthouse fire in an unrelated case involving plaintiffs’ counsel.After defendants were served, they removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for insufficient diligence in service and granted summary judgment for the corporate defendants. The district court found that plaintiffs had waited too long at several points—three days before forwarding citations, several weeks before following up with the process server, and additional days before clarifying instructions—thus concluding that plaintiffs failed to exercise sufficient diligence as required by Texas law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court applied a more demanding standard than Texas law requires. Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show ordinary diligence in effecting service after timely filing suit. The appellate court found that plaintiffs’ explanations for the short delays, including handling a complex service task involving multiple corporate defendants and temporary distractions from an unrelated courthouse fire, were sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing" on Justia Law

American Airlines contracted with a uniform manufacturer to provide new apparel for its employees. After distribution, many employees reported health issues, including skin and respiratory symptoms, allegedly connected to wearing or being near the uniforms. The airline allowed employees to stop wearing the uniforms, ultimately replacing them. Laboratory and government testing found low levels of chemicals in the uniforms but concluded these were unlikely to cause the reported symptoms. Multiple alternative causes were identified, and the scientific evidence did not support the employees' claims.A group of employees sued American Airlines, the manufacturer, and others in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, initially seeking class certification under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After several amended complaints and significant discovery disputes, the plaintiffs dropped their request for class certification, briefly raising questions about the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. They later re-pled their class allegations in a fourth amended complaint, and the district court determined it retained jurisdiction. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing these experts were essential to prove defect and causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court properly retained jurisdiction under CAFA after plaintiffs reasserted class claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ experts due to unreliable methodologies. It further held that, without expert evidence, the plaintiffs could not establish a defect or causation under strict or negligent products liability. The court also held that neither the Tweedy doctrine nor res ipsa loquitur provided an evidentiary shortcut under the case facts, since the alleged injuries did not inherently indicate a product defect or negligence. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Zurbriggen v Twin Hill Acquisition, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee at a food processing plant was severely injured during a scheduled inspection of a boiler used to heat cooking oil. The boiler, manufactured and periodically inspected by a third-party company, exploded while the employee and his supervisor were checking its safety devices. The explosion caused significant burns to both men. The boiler had been manufactured twenty-one years earlier, and had undergone both regular quarterly and annual inspections by the manufacturer, with no issues reported. An inspection of the accident scene took place within weeks, but the injured employee was not notified or present for that inspection.After the accident, the injured employee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, alleging that the manufacturer was liable under theories of strict products liability and negligence, claiming defects in design, manufacturing, and marketing, and inadequate inspections. During litigation, the plaintiff’s expert suggested that a leak in the boiler’s coils likely caused the explosion but admitted an inability to identify a specific defect or rule out numerous other possible causes. The district court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, finding no evidence of a defect, breach of duty, or proximate causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence to show either that the boiler was defective or that the manufacturer’s inspections were negligent in a way that proximately caused the injuries. The court emphasized that conjecture and speculation were insufficient to survive summary judgment, and that the plaintiff’s evidence did not exclude other possible causes or establish the manufacturer’s liability. View "Rhodes v. Fulton Thermal Corp." on Justia Law

A woman developed mesothelioma and lung cancer, allegedly due to exposure to asbestos dust brought home on her husband’s work clothing. Her husband, a professional insulator, installed asbestos-containing insulation on turbines manufactured by a defendant company at a Maryland power plant in the 1960s. Facilities for workers to shower or change at the worksite were not provided, so he regularly brought dusty work clothes home. The woman, who never visited the worksite, handled and laundered these clothes, potentially exposing herself to asbestos fibers. After her death, her estate continued the personal injury and wrongful death action against the manufacturer and others.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment to the defendant on all claims, including strict liability for design defect. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment concerning the design defect claim and remanded the case. Following further proceedings, the Superior Court again granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that as a bystander, the plaintiff could not recover on a strict liability theory. This led to a second appeal, after which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court of Maryland the question of whether, under Maryland law, a household member exposed to asbestos dust brought home by a worker must prove an additional element of duty in a strict liability design defect claim.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a household member in the plaintiff’s position is not required to prove the additional element of duty beyond the four elements of strict liability for design defect as set forth in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. The court clarified that, unlike failure to warn and negligence claims, duty is not a required element for strict liability design defect claims, whether for users, consumers, or household members exposed through no fault of their own. View "Quinn v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

A workplace accident in 2020 resulted in the death of Colby Eldon Johnson, who was using a self-unloading bed manufactured by SRM-Double L, LLC (“SRM”) on his employer’s truck. Colby’s father, Harry Johnson, filed suit against SRM and others, alleging products liability and negligence. During pretrial proceedings, Johnson failed to submit timely responses to SRM’s discovery requests and did not file his opposition to SRM’s summary judgment motion by the court-ordered deadline. He later filed late motions and exhibits, citing scheduling conflicts and unresolved discovery issues.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Gooding County, granted SRM’s motions to strike Johnson’s untimely filings, finding no valid justification for the delay. Consequently, the court treated SRM’s summary judgment motion as unopposed and granted summary judgment in SRM’s favor, finding Johnson’s claims barred by Idaho statutes. The court also awarded attorney fees and sanctions against Johnson and his counsel under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37, based on alleged misrepresentations and discovery delays.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to strike Johnson’s untimely filings, finding no abuse of discretion. However, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the lower court failed to analyze whether SRM had met its burden under Rule 56(a), which is required even if the motion is unopposed. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney fees under Rule 37 for discovery violations but reversed the sanctions under Rule 11 because the only support for the sanctions was inadmissible hearsay. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. Attorney fees on appeal were denied, as no party had yet prevailed. View "Johnson v. SRM-Double L, LLC" on Justia Law

A police sergeant was injured during a training exercise when his department-issued semi-automatic pistol discharged while holstered, resulting in a gunshot wound to his leg. He could not explain what caused the trigger to be actuated but maintained that his hand was not on the weapon at the moment it discharged. He and his wife sued the firearm manufacturer, alleging strict products liability and negligence, and asserting that the pistol’s design was defective—particularly, that it lacked an external safety mechanism, making it more susceptible to unintentional discharge.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiffs sought to introduce expert testimony to establish that the design defect, specifically the lack of an external safety, caused the injury. The district court excluded the experts’ causation opinions, finding them unreliable because the experts did not adequately address the specifics of the incident or test their theories under similar circumstances. The court then granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, holding that under New York law, expert testimony as to proximate causation was necessary due to the complexity of the issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude the experts’ causation opinions, finding the exclusion within the court’s discretion. However, the appellate court held that New York law does not require expert testimony on proximate causation in all product liability cases, especially where jurors can use their own judgment, aided by other evidence, to assess causation. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could decide, based on the design-defect evidence and the circumstances of the accident, whether an external safety would have prevented the injury. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hayes v Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law