Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

A 20-year-old college student, while on spring break in Alabama, purchased alcohol from a Walmart store using a fake Georgia driver’s license that falsely indicated he was of legal age. A Walmart cashier checked the ID for a few seconds before approving the sale. The following day, after consuming several alcoholic beverages purchased from Walmart, the student drove under the influence and struck and killed an 80-year-old man, James Reed, who was riding a mobility scooter. Reed’s wife, Bonnie Estell, witnessed the accident. The student later admitted that his intoxication, caused by the alcohol bought at Walmart, played a role in the fatal incident.Reed’s widow, appointed by an Indiana court as special administrator of his estate for the purpose of pursuing wrongful death damages, brought a lawsuit against Walmart in the Baldwin Circuit Court. She asserted claims under Alabama’s Dram Shop Act, seeking damages for Reed’s death. Claims against the student driver were settled and dismissed, leaving Walmart as the sole defendant. The trial court denied Walmart’s motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, allowing the Dram Shop Act claim to proceed to a jury. The jury awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages against Walmart.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the Baldwin Circuit Court’s denial of Walmart’s postjudgment motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court held that the Dram Shop Act allows for a claim for death, expressly overruling prior precedent to the contrary. The Court further found that Estell’s appointment as special administrator was sufficient to assert such a claim, and that a jury question existed as to whether Walmart violated the law in selling alcohol to a minor. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Walmart, Inc. v. Estell" on Justia Law

Several school districts brought lawsuits against major social media companies, alleging that the companies’ platforms caused a mental health crisis among students. The districts claimed that these harms disrupted their educational missions, required additional spending on mental health and disciplinary services, and led to property vandalism, particularly through social media “challenges.” The complaints described features of the platforms as intentionally designed to maximize youth engagement and addictive use, which allegedly resulted in widespread student mental health issues and direct costs to the schools.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County consolidated the cases for demurrer briefing and ruled on complaints from school districts in California, Florida, Washington, and Rhode Island. The districts asserted claims for negligence and public nuisance under the laws of their respective states. In response, the social media defendants argued that the districts’ injuries were derivative of student harms, not cognizable under the legal theories pled, and that the claims were barred by doctrines such as the economic loss rule and federal immunity. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer in its entirety, finding no legal basis for the claims and denying leave to amend, except for Vancouver School District’s challenge regarding leave to amend.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the trial court’s rulings de novo. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the economic loss rule barred recovery for the school districts’ purely financial harms in negligence and that the alleged disruptions to educational missions and property were either not cognizable or shielded by federal immunity under Section 230. The court also found the public nuisance claims insufficiently pled under the respective state laws, especially lacking allegations that an entire community’s health was affected equally. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "Social Media Cases" on Justia Law

Six men, including two law enforcement officers and four members of a towing crew, responded to a tractor-trailer accident in St. Francis County, Arkansas, in April 2018. The accident involved an Old Dominion Freight Line truck transporting a 565-pound barrel of formic acid, a hazardous material. Although federal law did not require placarding for this volume, Old Dominion’s driver failed to disclose the presence of hazardous material when asked by emergency responders. The responders were subsequently exposed to toxic fumes, resulting in permanent respiratory and related injuries. All six men sought emergency medical care and later brought negligence claims against Old Dominion and its driver, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The St. Francis County Circuit Court held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding them $75 million in compensatory damages and finding no liability for punitive damages. The defendants' post-trial motions for a new trial or remittitur were denied by operation of law. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and ordered a new trial, finding the compensatory damages unsupported by substantial evidence. The parties petitioned for review, which the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted, treating the case as if originally filed there.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and vacated the court of appeals’ opinion. It held that, given the immediate and acute toxic exposure, a heightened causation standard was not required, and that the evidence—including expert medical testimony—was sufficient to support the jury’s proximate cause finding. The court further held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted by federal law, the professional-rescuer’s doctrine did not bar recovery, and the evidentiary and procedural rulings below were not abuses of discretion. Finally, the court found the damages award was supported by substantial evidence and was not so excessive as to shock the conscience. View "OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC. v. MCMILLION" on Justia Law

A Nevada resident, Virginia Pass, allegedly suffered injuries and ultimately died after a Care@Home C7000 in-home medical alert system failed to alert emergency services following her fall. The device was purchased from Medical Guardian, a Pennsylvania-based reseller authorized by Essence USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation that distributes products manufactured by Essence SmartCare Ltd. Pass’s estate and her six children, some residing in Nevada and others in different states, filed suit against Essence USA and Medical Guardian in Nevada. The record did not establish where, how, or by whom the Care@Home device was acquired, only that it was used in Nevada.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, dismissed Essence USA for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Essence USA had insufficient contacts with Nevada. Morgan, representing Pass’s estate, was permitted to amend the complaint and conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. The evidence showed that Essence USA attended the Consumer Electronic Show (CES) in Las Vegas to promote its products to resellers, and had entered into agreements with Medical Guardian authorizing resale in the United States and Canada. However, there was no evidence of direct sales or marketing to Nevada consumers, nor confirmation that more than one product ever reached Nevada. The district court denied reconsideration and certified its dismissal as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that, under Nevada’s adoption of the pure stream-of-commerce test for specific personal jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must introduce products into the stream of commerce with the expectation of a regular flow to Nevada. The plaintiffs failed to show more than a single isolated instance of a product reaching Nevada or any meaningful connection between their claims and Essence USA’s in-state contacts at CES. Thus, Essence USA was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. View "MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC." on Justia Law

The appellant purchased and consumed a frozen “Oven Ready Breaded Cod Fillets” product sold by the appellee. While eating the fillet, a bone became lodged in her esophagus, causing her significant pain, medical treatment, and surgery. She claimed that the packaging’s “oven ready” and “breaded” descriptions led her to believe the product would be free of bones and thus safe to eat without risk of injury. As a result, she suffered physical and emotional harm, lost wages, ongoing impairment, and medical costs.After the incident, the appellant filed a complaint against the company in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging several causes of action including negligence for failure to warn, breach of warranty, strict products liability, and violation of consumer protection law. The company moved to dismiss all counts. The Superior Court initially dismissed all counts except negligence, finding enough factual allegations to suggest a failure to warn about bones. The company then filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that consumers should expect fish bones as a matter of law. The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the remaining negligence claim under Rule 12(b)(6), determining that the risk was obvious and no duty to warn existed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that whether fish bones are an obvious risk in a breaded, oven-ready fish fillet is a question of fact for a jury, not a legal determination appropriate for dismissal at this stage. The court also found that the harm caused by ingesting a fish bone—especially one requiring hospitalization and surgery—was not obviously foreseeable to all consumers. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bahrampour v. Trader Joe's Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A maintenance technician was injured at a bottling plant in California when a robot and a depalletizer malfunctioned while he was performing repairs. The depalletizer, manufactured by Krones, Inc., released its gripper head and severely injured the technician. The robot involved in the incident was manufactured by a Japanese company. The technician sued Krones, the Japanese robot manufacturer, and the American subsidiary of the Japanese manufacturer. While the American subsidiary did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction, the Japanese parent company moved to quash service, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the Japanese company’s motion to quash, finding that it was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory, relying on the relationship between the Japanese parent and its American subsidiary. The trial court also referenced its earlier finding, during a summary judgment motion, that there was evidence the parent and subsidiary operated as a single enterprise, or alter egos.On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, independently analyzed whether California courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company. The appellate court held that neither general nor specific jurisdiction applied. It determined that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the connections between the Japanese company and California, even when considering the actions of its American subsidiary, were insufficient to render the parent company “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show that his claims arose out of or related to the Japanese company’s contacts with California, as required for specific jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. View "Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Lucas Warner, a young man with a history of seizures and cerebrovascular disease, died after taking a single dose of Aimovig, a biologic drug manufactured by Amgen and approved by the FDA to prevent migraines. His mother, acting as representative of his estate, argued that the drug’s label was inadequate because it failed to disclose that the clinical trials excluded people with histories of seizures and neurological disorders, and did not warn of specific risks for such patients. She contended that this omission was especially relevant to Lucas’s medical circumstances.After Warner filed a wrongful death claim in Massachusetts state court, Amgen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Amgen moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing federal law preempted Warner’s state law claims because Amgen was required to use the FDA-approved label and Warner had not shown Amgen could have unilaterally changed it. At the hearing, Warner sought leave to amend her complaint, alleging newly available studies could have permitted Amgen to update the label using FDA’s Changes Being Effected (CBE) procedure. The district court dismissed the complaint as preempted and denied leave to amend, finding the studies insufficient and the amendment futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of Warner’s original complaint, holding that federal law preempted the claim because Amgen could not unilaterally alter the label during FDA approval, and the FDA would have rejected Warner’s proposed label changes. However, it reversed the denial of leave to amend, holding Warner plausibly alleged that certain studies constituted newly acquired information under the CBE process. The case was remanded for further proceedings limited to Warner’s claims based on this post-approval labeling theory. View "Warner v. Amgen Inc." on Justia Law

A pharmacy, operated by a licensed pharmacist, improperly compounded a prescription medication for a patient after a technician mistakenly entered a formula with the wrong dosage. The patient consumed the medication, suffered severe poisoning, required intensive medical treatment, and subsequently filed suit against the pharmacy and the pharmacist. She alleged negligence, wantonness, product liability, breach of the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and failure to warn. The pharmacy’s liability insurer, Nationwide, declined coverage, citing a professional-services exclusion in its policy. The pharmacy had previously been covered by a different insurer, Zurich, whose policy did not exclude such claims.After the patient obtained a substantial judgment against the pharmacy, a separate action was brought to determine whether the Nationwide policy covered the claim and whether the insurance agents who procured the policy for the pharmacy had been negligent or wanton in failing to secure proper coverage. The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court entered summary judgment for Nationwide, finding the professional-services exclusion applied, and for the insurance agents, concluding the pharmacy was contributorily negligent for not reading its policy.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that the professional-services exclusion in the Nationwide policy unambiguously barred coverage for all claims, including product-liability claims, arising from the compounding of medication, which is a professional service under Alabama law. The Supreme Court also held that the pharmacy was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to read its insurance policy, which expressly excluded the type of coverage in question, thereby precluding any claim for negligent failure to procure insurance. The summary judgments in favor of Nationwide and the agency defendants were affirmed. View "OMS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A patient underwent surgery in Texas, during which a specific surgical stapler and staple product were used to reconnect sections of his colon. After initial success, he suffered severe complications days later, including sepsis, allegedly caused by a defect in the staple line. This resulted in months of treatment and ultimately his death. His widow and children sued several product manufacturers and sellers, asserting claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and other product liability theories.Initially, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Johnson & Johnson, Ethicon, and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (“Phillips I”). Discovery revealed confusion about the identity of the actual seller, prompting the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. alone, asserting only breach of warranty claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability without prejudice, primarily due to lack of presuit notice required under Texas law. The district court instead dismissed both claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile and that the plaintiffs had not provided proper notice or shown how they could cure the defect.After dismissal in Phillips I, the plaintiffs filed a second suit in state court (“Phillips II”) against additional parties. This case was removed to federal court, where the defendants moved for dismissal based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Phillips II with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed both district court judgments, holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim due to lack of presuit notice, the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion, and preclusion doctrines properly barred the second suit. View "Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from a developer and later alleged that defective grading and drainage in the subdivision caused water and erosion damage to their property. They claimed that the developer and seller deviated from an approved drainage plan, redirecting stormwater onto their lot. The plaintiffs discovered the source of the problem several years after purchasing the property, following a heavy rainstorm. Their claims included negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction.The District Court of Oklahoma County conducted a bench trial. After the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict and argued that the tort and warranty claims were barred by Oklahoma’s ten-year statute of repose (12 O.S. § 109), and the contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations (12 O.S. § 95). The trial court found that the improvement causing the harm was substantially completed more than ten years before suit, and that the contract claim accrued on the date the lot was conveyed. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants on all claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that the statute of repose begins to run upon substantial completion of the specific improvement alleged to have caused harm, not the completion of the overall development. The only evidence of substantial completion was uncontroverted, showing completion more than ten years before suit, barring the tort claims. The implied warranty and contract claims were also time-barred by the statute of limitations, and Turner & Company was not a party to the contract. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC." on Justia Law