Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

A maintenance technician was injured at a bottling plant in California when a robot and a depalletizer malfunctioned while he was performing repairs. The depalletizer, manufactured by Krones, Inc., released its gripper head and severely injured the technician. The robot involved in the incident was manufactured by a Japanese company. The technician sued Krones, the Japanese robot manufacturer, and the American subsidiary of the Japanese manufacturer. While the American subsidiary did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction, the Japanese parent company moved to quash service, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the Japanese company’s motion to quash, finding that it was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory, relying on the relationship between the Japanese parent and its American subsidiary. The trial court also referenced its earlier finding, during a summary judgment motion, that there was evidence the parent and subsidiary operated as a single enterprise, or alter egos.On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, independently analyzed whether California courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company. The appellate court held that neither general nor specific jurisdiction applied. It determined that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the connections between the Japanese company and California, even when considering the actions of its American subsidiary, were insufficient to render the parent company “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show that his claims arose out of or related to the Japanese company’s contacts with California, as required for specific jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. View "Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Lucas Warner, a young man with a history of seizures and cerebrovascular disease, died after taking a single dose of Aimovig, a biologic drug manufactured by Amgen and approved by the FDA to prevent migraines. His mother, acting as representative of his estate, argued that the drug’s label was inadequate because it failed to disclose that the clinical trials excluded people with histories of seizures and neurological disorders, and did not warn of specific risks for such patients. She contended that this omission was especially relevant to Lucas’s medical circumstances.After Warner filed a wrongful death claim in Massachusetts state court, Amgen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Amgen moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing federal law preempted Warner’s state law claims because Amgen was required to use the FDA-approved label and Warner had not shown Amgen could have unilaterally changed it. At the hearing, Warner sought leave to amend her complaint, alleging newly available studies could have permitted Amgen to update the label using FDA’s Changes Being Effected (CBE) procedure. The district court dismissed the complaint as preempted and denied leave to amend, finding the studies insufficient and the amendment futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of Warner’s original complaint, holding that federal law preempted the claim because Amgen could not unilaterally alter the label during FDA approval, and the FDA would have rejected Warner’s proposed label changes. However, it reversed the denial of leave to amend, holding Warner plausibly alleged that certain studies constituted newly acquired information under the CBE process. The case was remanded for further proceedings limited to Warner’s claims based on this post-approval labeling theory. View "Warner v. Amgen Inc." on Justia Law

A pharmacy, operated by a licensed pharmacist, improperly compounded a prescription medication for a patient after a technician mistakenly entered a formula with the wrong dosage. The patient consumed the medication, suffered severe poisoning, required intensive medical treatment, and subsequently filed suit against the pharmacy and the pharmacist. She alleged negligence, wantonness, product liability, breach of the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and failure to warn. The pharmacy’s liability insurer, Nationwide, declined coverage, citing a professional-services exclusion in its policy. The pharmacy had previously been covered by a different insurer, Zurich, whose policy did not exclude such claims.After the patient obtained a substantial judgment against the pharmacy, a separate action was brought to determine whether the Nationwide policy covered the claim and whether the insurance agents who procured the policy for the pharmacy had been negligent or wanton in failing to secure proper coverage. The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court entered summary judgment for Nationwide, finding the professional-services exclusion applied, and for the insurance agents, concluding the pharmacy was contributorily negligent for not reading its policy.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that the professional-services exclusion in the Nationwide policy unambiguously barred coverage for all claims, including product-liability claims, arising from the compounding of medication, which is a professional service under Alabama law. The Supreme Court also held that the pharmacy was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to read its insurance policy, which expressly excluded the type of coverage in question, thereby precluding any claim for negligent failure to procure insurance. The summary judgments in favor of Nationwide and the agency defendants were affirmed. View "OMS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A patient underwent surgery in Texas, during which a specific surgical stapler and staple product were used to reconnect sections of his colon. After initial success, he suffered severe complications days later, including sepsis, allegedly caused by a defect in the staple line. This resulted in months of treatment and ultimately his death. His widow and children sued several product manufacturers and sellers, asserting claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and other product liability theories.Initially, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Johnson & Johnson, Ethicon, and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (“Phillips I”). Discovery revealed confusion about the identity of the actual seller, prompting the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. alone, asserting only breach of warranty claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability without prejudice, primarily due to lack of presuit notice required under Texas law. The district court instead dismissed both claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile and that the plaintiffs had not provided proper notice or shown how they could cure the defect.After dismissal in Phillips I, the plaintiffs filed a second suit in state court (“Phillips II”) against additional parties. This case was removed to federal court, where the defendants moved for dismissal based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Phillips II with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed both district court judgments, holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim due to lack of presuit notice, the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion, and preclusion doctrines properly barred the second suit. View "Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from a developer and later alleged that defective grading and drainage in the subdivision caused water and erosion damage to their property. They claimed that the developer and seller deviated from an approved drainage plan, redirecting stormwater onto their lot. The plaintiffs discovered the source of the problem several years after purchasing the property, following a heavy rainstorm. Their claims included negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction.The District Court of Oklahoma County conducted a bench trial. After the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict and argued that the tort and warranty claims were barred by Oklahoma’s ten-year statute of repose (12 O.S. § 109), and the contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations (12 O.S. § 95). The trial court found that the improvement causing the harm was substantially completed more than ten years before suit, and that the contract claim accrued on the date the lot was conveyed. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants on all claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that the statute of repose begins to run upon substantial completion of the specific improvement alleged to have caused harm, not the completion of the overall development. The only evidence of substantial completion was uncontroverted, showing completion more than ten years before suit, barring the tort claims. The implied warranty and contract claims were also time-barred by the statute of limitations, and Turner & Company was not a party to the contract. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC." on Justia Law

Katharine Blackwell, a regular customer at a car dealership, slipped and fell on a wet floor that had just been mopped by a dealership employee. The employee did not place a wet-floor sign before or during mopping and left the area unattended while retrieving a sign, which was stored about a minute away. While the employee was gone, another employee called Ms. Blackwell to the service desk, leading her to walk across the freshly mopped, unmarked area and fall. She had not seen the mopping take place and received no warning about the hazard.Ms. Blackwell filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, asserting negligence under premises liability and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. After discovery, the dealership moved for summary judgment, arguing it had insufficient time to warn Ms. Blackwell before she fell, relying on precedent from Rehn v. Westfield America. The circuit court granted summary judgment on both claims, finding that although the dealership had notice of the wet floor, there was no genuine dispute that it lacked time to post a warning sign.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed summary judgment on the negligent hiring and supervision claim but reversed with respect to premises liability, concluding that a jury could find the dealership failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the hazard. The dealership sought review by the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that, under Maryland law, the knowledge element for an invitee’s premises liability claim is satisfied when an owner’s employee knowingly creates a dangerous condition. Where creating the hazard is a foreseeable consequence of an assigned task, whether the owner acted reasonably to prevent or warn of the danger is a jury question unless only one reasonable conclusion is possible. The Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment, allowing the premises liability claim to proceed. View "DARCARS Toyota of Silver Spring v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

Several Central and South American banana plantation workers brought suit alleging that their health was harmed due to exposure to the pesticide dibromochloropropane (DBCP). One plaintiff, Fernando Jimenez Arias, worked as a quality fruit inspector for a Del Monte subsidiary in Costa Rica from 1971 to 1973. His duties included rotating among various farms, sometimes entering banana fields, and sleeping in warehouses where agricultural chemicals were stored, though he never directly handled or observed the application of DBCP. Arias and his wife experienced reproductive issues, including infertility and miscarriages, which they attributed to DBCP exposure.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted Dow Chemical Company’s motions for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert, Michael J. DiBartolomeis, concluding there was no evidence Arias was exposed to DBCP or that such exposure caused his injuries. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. joined in these motions. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated these orders, holding that Arias’s testimony and other evidence raised genuine issues of material fact regarding exposure and causation.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case on certiorari. It affirmed the ICA’s decision, holding that Arias had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of possible DBCP exposure and that the expert’s testimony was admissible. The court adopted a new approach for causation in toxic tort cases, following the Restatement (Third) of Torts: first, the plaintiff must show exposure to the agent; second, general causation; and third, specific causation. The court clarified that expert testimony is required and that no rigid dosage proof is necessary. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Patrickson v. DOW Chemical Company" on Justia Law

Insurance companies paid claims to policyholders whose Hyundai or Kia vehicles were stolen or damaged due to a vulnerability stemming from the lack of an engine immobilizer in certain models from 2011 to 2022. These companies, as subrogees, filed a nationwide class action alleging that the Korean manufacturers, Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Corporation, defectively designed these vehicles, making them prone to theft. The complaint also asserted claims for breach of warranties, violations of consumer protection statutes, fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligent failure to warn.Multiple lawsuits arising from this issue were consolidated into multidistrict litigation before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court dismissed the claims against the Korean entities for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the evidence did not establish intentional targeting of California by the manufacturers and that the claims did not arise from California-related conduct. The district court also denied leave to amend and jurisdictional discovery, entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) dismissing the Korean entities from the subrogation track.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the Korean manufacturers were subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California. The panel found that the manufacturers purposefully directed their activities toward California by sending thousands of shipments of vehicles through California ports and designing vehicles specifically for the U.S. market. The court further held that the claims arose out of these California contacts, as the injuries were caused by vehicles shipped to California. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the question of reasonableness of jurisdiction for the district court to resolve. View "IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION" on Justia Law

A helicopter owned and operated by the Huntington Beach Police Department crashed in 2022, resulting in the death of Officer Nicholas Vella and serious injury to Officer RJ Garwood. The plaintiffs alleged that the crash was caused by a defect in the helicopter’s stability augmentation system. The helicopter, a model MD520N, was manufactured by The Boeing Company in 1998 and delivered to the police department that same year. It had a seating capacity of five and was type and airworthiness certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).The plaintiffs initially brought their claims for strict products liability, breach of warranties, and negligence in California state court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The defendants, including The Boeing Company and MacD Helicopters, moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act’s (GARA) 18-year statute of repose. The plaintiffs contended that GARA did not apply to “public aircraft” such as those owned by governmental entities. The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, found that the helicopter met GARA’s definition of “general aviation aircraft,” and granted the motions to dismiss. The court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal and stayed further proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether GARA’s statute of repose applied to the police helicopter. The court held that the statute’s definition of “general aviation aircraft” includes government-owned aircraft, as long as the statutory requirements are met. The panel expressly rejected the argument that the Federal Aviation Act’s “public aircraft” definition is incorporated into GARA and concluded that GARA contains no “public aircraft” exception. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. View "VELLA V. MACD HELICOPTERS, INC." on Justia Law

Several counties and municipalities in New York initiated lawsuits in state courts against two pharmacy benefit managers, Express Scripts, Inc. and OptumRx, Inc., alleging that these companies contributed to the opioid epidemic in their communities. The claims are based on state law and center on the defendants’ alleged practices in negotiating with opioid manufacturers and managing prescription formularies, which plaintiffs contend led to an oversupply of prescription opioids and caused substantial public harm and government expense.The defendants removed the cases to federal court—the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York—arguing removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because some of the challenged conduct was performed under contracts with federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense (TRICARE), the Office of Personnel Management (FEHBP), and the Veterans Health Administration. After removal, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to disclaim any claims based on the defendants’ work for federal clients, seeking to have the cases remanded to state court. The district courts accepted the disclaimers and remanded the cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district courts’ decisions. It concluded that the disclaimers were ineffective because the alleged wrongful conduct and resulting harms could not be separated between federal and non-federal clients; the conduct was indivisible. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, the Second Circuit held that the defendants satisfied all statutory requirements for federal officer removal: they acted under federal direction, were sued for acts relating to federal authority, and asserted colorable federal defenses. The Second Circuit therefore reversed the remand orders and returned the cases to the district courts for further proceedings. View "County of Westchester v. Express Scripts" on Justia Law