Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries
Pohl v. Duda Energy, LLC
Several individuals purchased sodium nitrite online from a company headquartered in Alabama. Sodium nitrite, while commonly used for meat curing, can cause death if ingested in high quantities. The purchasers, who resided in Florida, Tennessee, and Minnesota, used the chemical to end their own lives. Representatives of the deceased presented evidence that the company had previously been notified of other suicides tied to its product and had adopted, but failed to follow, an internal policy to screen sodium nitrite sales. Despite this, the company sold the product to the decedents without additional precautions.In the Madison Circuit Court, the plaintiffs brought various claims under the laws of the states where the deaths occurred, including negligence, wantonness, wrongful death, loss of consortium, and outrage. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant in an unexplained order. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the company had a duty to prevent foreseeable misuse of its product and that their claims should survive summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. Applying the relevant state laws, it found that under Florida law, there was no duty for the company to prevent suicide absent specific knowledge of the individual’s suicidal intent or a statutory requirement. Under Tennessee law, suicide was a superseding cause, precluding liability unless the defendant had a special relationship or specific knowledge, which was absent here. Under Minnesota law, the court found no duty to screen buyers for lawful products beyond a duty to warn of foreseeable misuse. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any legal error or basis for liability under the relevant laws. View "Pohl v. Duda Energy, LLC" on Justia Law
Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
Several property owners in and around Merrimack, New Hampshire, brought an action alleging that a plastics manufacturing facility released airborne toxic chemicals, specifically perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), which subsequently contaminated local drinking water sources, including both private wells and the municipal water supply. They claimed harm to their property interests due to this contamination and sought damages for diminution in property value, costs of remediation, and loss of use and enjoyment, among other injuries.After the case was removed from New Hampshire state court, it proceeded in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of property owners in the affected geographic area. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for liability issues on trespass, negligence, and negligent failure to warn, but denied certification for nuisance and for damages issues, which it found to be individualized. The district court bifurcated proceedings, planning to address liability on a class-wide basis first, with damages to be determined in later, individualized proceedings. Saint-Gobain, the principal defendant, was granted permission to appeal the certification order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court reversed the class certification as to negligence and negligent failure to warn, finding that injury and causation on those claims would require individualized, property-by-property proof that predominated over common issues. However, the court affirmed class certification for liability on the trespass claim, concluding that, under New Hampshire law, plaintiffs need only prove the intentional physical invasion of their property by PFOA attributable to the facility, which could be established on a common basis. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law
Fleming v. LG Chem Ltd.
A resident of Anderson, South Carolina alleged he suffered burns when a lithium-ion battery in his vape pen exploded in Charleston. He claimed that a South Korean corporation manufactured the battery, which he purchased from a local retailer. The complaint asserted that the manufacturer had significant contacts with South Carolina, including the distribution and sale of lithium-ion batteries and knowledge that such batteries were being sold individually for use in vape pens without adequate safety protections. The plaintiff also referenced other similar lawsuits in South Carolina and alleged that the manufacturer knew its batteries were reaching consumers in the state.The manufacturer moved to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it only sold batteries in packs to commercial customers, not individual consumers, and therefore the plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of its contacts with South Carolina. The Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding no personal jurisdiction. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, over a dissent.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case on certiorari and reversed the lower courts’ rulings. It held that South Carolina courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer. The court reasoned that the manufacturer had purposefully availed itself of the South Carolina market for lithium-ion batteries, including the type at issue, and that the plaintiff’s claims arose out of or related to the manufacturer’s contacts with the state. The court found that due process permits jurisdiction under these circumstances, as it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The Supreme Court concluded that the manufacturer must defend itself in South Carolina for conduct related to its activities in the state. View "Fleming v. LG Chem Ltd." on Justia Law
Walmart, Inc. v. Estell
A 20-year-old college student, while on spring break in Alabama, purchased alcohol from a Walmart store using a fake Georgia driver’s license that falsely indicated he was of legal age. A Walmart cashier checked the ID for a few seconds before approving the sale. The following day, after consuming several alcoholic beverages purchased from Walmart, the student drove under the influence and struck and killed an 80-year-old man, James Reed, who was riding a mobility scooter. Reed’s wife, Bonnie Estell, witnessed the accident. The student later admitted that his intoxication, caused by the alcohol bought at Walmart, played a role in the fatal incident.Reed’s widow, appointed by an Indiana court as special administrator of his estate for the purpose of pursuing wrongful death damages, brought a lawsuit against Walmart in the Baldwin Circuit Court. She asserted claims under Alabama’s Dram Shop Act, seeking damages for Reed’s death. Claims against the student driver were settled and dismissed, leaving Walmart as the sole defendant. The trial court denied Walmart’s motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, allowing the Dram Shop Act claim to proceed to a jury. The jury awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages against Walmart.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the Baldwin Circuit Court’s denial of Walmart’s postjudgment motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court held that the Dram Shop Act allows for a claim for death, expressly overruling prior precedent to the contrary. The Court further found that Estell’s appointment as special administrator was sufficient to assert such a claim, and that a jury question existed as to whether Walmart violated the law in selling alcohol to a minor. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Walmart, Inc. v. Estell" on Justia Law
Social Media Cases
Several school districts brought lawsuits against major social media companies, alleging that the companies’ platforms caused a mental health crisis among students. The districts claimed that these harms disrupted their educational missions, required additional spending on mental health and disciplinary services, and led to property vandalism, particularly through social media “challenges.” The complaints described features of the platforms as intentionally designed to maximize youth engagement and addictive use, which allegedly resulted in widespread student mental health issues and direct costs to the schools.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County consolidated the cases for demurrer briefing and ruled on complaints from school districts in California, Florida, Washington, and Rhode Island. The districts asserted claims for negligence and public nuisance under the laws of their respective states. In response, the social media defendants argued that the districts’ injuries were derivative of student harms, not cognizable under the legal theories pled, and that the claims were barred by doctrines such as the economic loss rule and federal immunity. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer in its entirety, finding no legal basis for the claims and denying leave to amend, except for Vancouver School District’s challenge regarding leave to amend.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the trial court’s rulings de novo. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the economic loss rule barred recovery for the school districts’ purely financial harms in negligence and that the alleged disruptions to educational missions and property were either not cognizable or shielded by federal immunity under Section 230. The court also found the public nuisance claims insufficiently pled under the respective state laws, especially lacking allegations that an entire community’s health was affected equally. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "Social Media Cases" on Justia Law
OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC. v. MCMILLION
Six men, including two law enforcement officers and four members of a towing crew, responded to a tractor-trailer accident in St. Francis County, Arkansas, in April 2018. The accident involved an Old Dominion Freight Line truck transporting a 565-pound barrel of formic acid, a hazardous material. Although federal law did not require placarding for this volume, Old Dominion’s driver failed to disclose the presence of hazardous material when asked by emergency responders. The responders were subsequently exposed to toxic fumes, resulting in permanent respiratory and related injuries. All six men sought emergency medical care and later brought negligence claims against Old Dominion and its driver, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The St. Francis County Circuit Court held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding them $75 million in compensatory damages and finding no liability for punitive damages. The defendants' post-trial motions for a new trial or remittitur were denied by operation of law. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and ordered a new trial, finding the compensatory damages unsupported by substantial evidence. The parties petitioned for review, which the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted, treating the case as if originally filed there.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and vacated the court of appeals’ opinion. It held that, given the immediate and acute toxic exposure, a heightened causation standard was not required, and that the evidence—including expert medical testimony—was sufficient to support the jury’s proximate cause finding. The court further held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted by federal law, the professional-rescuer’s doctrine did not bar recovery, and the evidentiary and procedural rulings below were not abuses of discretion. Finally, the court found the damages award was supported by substantial evidence and was not so excessive as to shock the conscience. View "OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC. v. MCMILLION" on Justia Law
MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC.
A Nevada resident, Virginia Pass, allegedly suffered injuries and ultimately died after a Care@Home C7000 in-home medical alert system failed to alert emergency services following her fall. The device was purchased from Medical Guardian, a Pennsylvania-based reseller authorized by Essence USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation that distributes products manufactured by Essence SmartCare Ltd. Pass’s estate and her six children, some residing in Nevada and others in different states, filed suit against Essence USA and Medical Guardian in Nevada. The record did not establish where, how, or by whom the Care@Home device was acquired, only that it was used in Nevada.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, dismissed Essence USA for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Essence USA had insufficient contacts with Nevada. Morgan, representing Pass’s estate, was permitted to amend the complaint and conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. The evidence showed that Essence USA attended the Consumer Electronic Show (CES) in Las Vegas to promote its products to resellers, and had entered into agreements with Medical Guardian authorizing resale in the United States and Canada. However, there was no evidence of direct sales or marketing to Nevada consumers, nor confirmation that more than one product ever reached Nevada. The district court denied reconsideration and certified its dismissal as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that, under Nevada’s adoption of the pure stream-of-commerce test for specific personal jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must introduce products into the stream of commerce with the expectation of a regular flow to Nevada. The plaintiffs failed to show more than a single isolated instance of a product reaching Nevada or any meaningful connection between their claims and Essence USA’s in-state contacts at CES. Thus, Essence USA was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. View "MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC." on Justia Law
Bahrampour v. Trader Joe’s Company, Inc.
The appellant purchased and consumed a frozen “Oven Ready Breaded Cod Fillets” product sold by the appellee. While eating the fillet, a bone became lodged in her esophagus, causing her significant pain, medical treatment, and surgery. She claimed that the packaging’s “oven ready” and “breaded” descriptions led her to believe the product would be free of bones and thus safe to eat without risk of injury. As a result, she suffered physical and emotional harm, lost wages, ongoing impairment, and medical costs.After the incident, the appellant filed a complaint against the company in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging several causes of action including negligence for failure to warn, breach of warranty, strict products liability, and violation of consumer protection law. The company moved to dismiss all counts. The Superior Court initially dismissed all counts except negligence, finding enough factual allegations to suggest a failure to warn about bones. The company then filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that consumers should expect fish bones as a matter of law. The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the remaining negligence claim under Rule 12(b)(6), determining that the risk was obvious and no duty to warn existed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that whether fish bones are an obvious risk in a breaded, oven-ready fish fillet is a question of fact for a jury, not a legal determination appropriate for dismissal at this stage. The court also found that the harm caused by ingesting a fish bone—especially one requiring hospitalization and surgery—was not obviously foreseeable to all consumers. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bahrampour v. Trader Joe's Company, Inc." on Justia Law
Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct.
A maintenance technician was injured at a bottling plant in California when a robot and a depalletizer malfunctioned while he was performing repairs. The depalletizer, manufactured by Krones, Inc., released its gripper head and severely injured the technician. The robot involved in the incident was manufactured by a Japanese company. The technician sued Krones, the Japanese robot manufacturer, and the American subsidiary of the Japanese manufacturer. While the American subsidiary did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction, the Japanese parent company moved to quash service, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the Japanese company’s motion to quash, finding that it was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory, relying on the relationship between the Japanese parent and its American subsidiary. The trial court also referenced its earlier finding, during a summary judgment motion, that there was evidence the parent and subsidiary operated as a single enterprise, or alter egos.On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, independently analyzed whether California courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company. The appellate court held that neither general nor specific jurisdiction applied. It determined that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the connections between the Japanese company and California, even when considering the actions of its American subsidiary, were insufficient to render the parent company “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show that his claims arose out of or related to the Japanese company’s contacts with California, as required for specific jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. View "Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law
Warner v. Amgen Inc.
Lucas Warner, a young man with a history of seizures and cerebrovascular disease, died after taking a single dose of Aimovig, a biologic drug manufactured by Amgen and approved by the FDA to prevent migraines. His mother, acting as representative of his estate, argued that the drug’s label was inadequate because it failed to disclose that the clinical trials excluded people with histories of seizures and neurological disorders, and did not warn of specific risks for such patients. She contended that this omission was especially relevant to Lucas’s medical circumstances.After Warner filed a wrongful death claim in Massachusetts state court, Amgen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Amgen moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing federal law preempted Warner’s state law claims because Amgen was required to use the FDA-approved label and Warner had not shown Amgen could have unilaterally changed it. At the hearing, Warner sought leave to amend her complaint, alleging newly available studies could have permitted Amgen to update the label using FDA’s Changes Being Effected (CBE) procedure. The district court dismissed the complaint as preempted and denied leave to amend, finding the studies insufficient and the amendment futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of Warner’s original complaint, holding that federal law preempted the claim because Amgen could not unilaterally alter the label during FDA approval, and the FDA would have rejected Warner’s proposed label changes. However, it reversed the denial of leave to amend, holding Warner plausibly alleged that certain studies constituted newly acquired information under the CBE process. The case was remanded for further proceedings limited to Warner’s claims based on this post-approval labeling theory. View "Warner v. Amgen Inc." on Justia Law