Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and Series PMPI filed a lawsuit in September 2018 against Fresenius Medical Care Holdings and related entities, alleging negligence, product liability, and design defect claims related to the GranuFlo product used in hemodialysis treatments. The claims arose from a 2012 public memorandum by Fresenius that GranuFlo could lead to cardiopulmonary arrest. The plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by a putative class action filed in 2013 (the Berzas action) in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was later transferred to the District of Massachusetts as part of multidistrict litigation (MDL).The District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, concluding that the Berzas action ceased to be a class action by June 2014 when the named plaintiffs filed Short Form Complaints or stipulations of dismissal, which did not include class allegations. The court also noted that the Berzas plaintiffs did not pursue class certification actively, and the case was administratively closed in April 2019.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The First Circuit held that the Berzas action lost its class action status by June 2014, and any tolling under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah ended at that time. The court reasoned that allowing indefinite tolling based on an inactive class certification request would contravene the principles of efficiency and economy in litigation. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 2018 complaint was untimely, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who were allegedly sexually assaulted or harassed by Uber drivers, filed individual lawsuits against Uber Technologies, Inc. across various districts. They claimed Uber failed to take reasonable measures to prevent such misconduct, asserting negligence, misrepresentation, products liability, and vicarious liability. Plaintiffs argued that Uber was aware of the issue since at least 2014 but did not implement adequate safety measures, such as proper background checks, emergency notifications, and effective responses to complaints.The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) centralized these cases in the Northern District of California for coordinated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Uber opposed the centralization, arguing that their terms of use included a collective action waiver that precluded such a transfer and that the cases did not share sufficient common factual questions to warrant centralization. The JPML found that the cases did involve common factual questions and that centralization would eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve resources.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Uber's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the JPML's order. The court held that Uber had not demonstrated that the JPML committed a clear error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. The court found that the JPML acted within its broad discretion in determining that the cases presented common questions of fact and that centralization would promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions. The court also rejected Uber's argument regarding the collective action waiver, stating that Section 1407 grants the JPML the authority to centralize cases regardless of private agreements to the contrary. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Uber's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION" on Justia Law

Vernon Holland was fatally injured by a rewinder machine at his workplace. Robert Cearley, Jr., representing Holland’s estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Bobst Group North America, Inc. (Bobst NA), the company responsible for delivering and installing the rewinder. The lawsuit sought damages based on several tort claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Bobst NA. The court ruled that Arkansas’s statute of repose, which limits the time frame for bringing claims related to construction or design defects, barred Cearley’s claims. Cearley appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether Bobst NA was protected under Arkansas Code § 16-56-112(b)(1), which is a statute of repose for claims arising from personal injury or wrongful death caused by construction defects. The court concluded that Bobst NA’s involvement in the delivery, installation, integration, and commissioning of the rewinder constituted the construction of an improvement to real property. The court also determined that the rewinder was an improvement to real property because it was affixed to the plant, furthered the purpose of the realty, and was designed for long-term use.As the lawsuit was filed more than four years after the installation of the rewinder, the court held that the claims were barred by the statute of repose. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Bobst NA. View "Cearley v. Bobst Group North America Inc." on Justia Law

James Wilson III used earplugs manufactured by Hearos, LLC at a shooting range and subsequently suffered significant hearing loss. He filed a lawsuit against Hearos in state court, alleging various tort claims. Protective Industrial Products, Inc. (PIP), a non-party, removed the case to federal court. The district court noted the unusual removal by a non-party but proceeded as neither Wilson nor Hearos objected to the court's jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Wilson's claims as time-barred under Georgia law.The district court for the Southern District of Georgia found that Wilson filed his complaint three days before the statute of limitations expired but did not serve Hearos until 117 days after the limitations period ended. The court concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate the required diligence in serving Hearos, leading to the dismissal of his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that removal by a non-party is a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one, and must be objected to within 30 days under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Since Wilson did not object within this period, he waived his right to challenge the removal. The court also affirmed that Georgia's service-and-diligence rule, rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), applied to determine if Wilson's claims were time-barred. The court concluded that Wilson did not act with the required diligence to serve Hearos, affirming the district court's dismissal of his claims. View "Wilson v. Hearos, LLC" on Justia Law

An underage user of the Grindr application, John Doe, filed a lawsuit against Grindr Inc. and Grindr LLC, alleging that the app facilitated his sexual exploitation by adult men. Doe claimed that Grindr's design and operation allowed him to be matched with adults despite being a minor, leading to his rape by four men, three of whom were later convicted. Doe's lawsuit included state law claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a federal claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Doe's claims, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provided Grindr with immunity from liability for the state law claims. The court also found that Doe failed to state a plausible claim under the TVPRA, as he did not sufficiently allege that Grindr knowingly participated in or benefitted from sex trafficking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 barred Doe's state law claims because they implicated Grindr's role as a publisher of third-party content. The court also agreed that Doe failed to state a plausible TVPRA claim, as he did not allege that Grindr had actual knowledge of or actively participated in sex trafficking. Consequently, Doe could not invoke the statutory exception to Section 230 immunity under the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2018. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Doe's claims in their entirety. View "DOE V. GRINDR INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged violations of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA) after their minor child, L.L., was severely injured. The injury occurred when a Graco car seat, placed on a kitchen counter next to an electric range stove, caught fire. The plaintiffs claimed that the car seat and stove were defectively designed or manufactured. As a result of the fire, L.L. suffered severe burns and injuries. The plaintiffs, including L.L.'s parents, also sought damages for loss of filial consortium, alleging that they lost the society, care, and companionship of their daughter due to her injuries.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed the case and certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court, asking whether Connecticut law recognizes a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium when a minor child suffers severe but nonfatal injuries due to a defendant's tortious conduct. The District Court had previously denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claims without prejudice.The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. The court reasoned that the justifications for recognizing loss of spousal and parental consortium claims, which are based on mutual dependence and reliance, do not apply to the parent-child relationship in the same way. The court emphasized that the emotional distress experienced by a parent due to a child's severe injury is distinct from the relational loss addressed by loss of consortium claims. The court found the reasoning of jurisdictions that distinguish between parental and filial consortium more persuasive and declined to expand the scope of liability to include loss of filial consortium. View "L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Eastern Maine Medical Center and eight other Maine hospitals (the Hospitals) who filed a 509-page complaint against various businesses and individuals (the Opioid Sellers) involved in the marketing and distribution of prescription opioids. The Hospitals alleged that the Opioid Sellers created illegitimate demand for opioids and unlawfully increased supply, leading to an opioid epidemic that caused the Hospitals to incur high costs for treating patients with opioid misuse, addiction, and dependency, with only partial reimbursement from insurance.The Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) dismissed the Hospitals' complaint. The court found that the complaint did not comply with the requirement for a "short and plain statement" of the claim but chose to dismiss it based on the legal insufficiency of the claims. The court concluded that the Hospitals could not recover under any of their legal theories, including negligence, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy. The court also denied the Hospitals' request for leave to amend their complaint.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The court held that the Hospitals' claims were legally insufficient. Specifically, the court found that the Hospitals did not have a direct negligence claim, as they did not suffer harm directly caused by the Opioid Sellers. The fraud and misrepresentation claims failed due to lack of reliance by the Hospitals on the Opioid Sellers' misrepresentations. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed because the Hospitals did not confer a benefit on the Opioid Sellers. The public nuisance claim failed as the Hospitals did not suffer a special injury different in kind from the public. Lastly, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed as it required an underlying tort, which was not present. The court concluded that the deficiencies in the complaint could not be remedied by amendment. View "Eastern Maine Medical Center v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

In June 2015, Dylann Roof shot and killed nine people at Mother Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, including M.P.'s father, Reverend Clementa Pinckney. M.P., a minor, filed a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) and its subsidiaries, alleging that Facebook's algorithm recommended harmful content that radicalized Roof, leading to the murders. M.P. asserted claims of strict products liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law, as well as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed M.P.'s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred her state law tort claims. The court also found that M.P. failed to plausibly allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that M.P.'s state law tort claims were barred by Section 230 because they sought to hold Facebook liable as a publisher of third-party content. The court also determined that M.P. failed to plausibly allege proximate causation under South Carolina law, as her complaint did not provide sufficient factual foundation linking Roof's Facebook use to his crimes. Additionally, the court found that M.P. forfeited her challenge to the dismissal of her Section 1985 claim by not adequately addressing it in her appellate brief. The court also concluded that any potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting Facebook's motion to dismiss. View "M.P. v. Meta Platforms Inc." on Justia Law

Timothy Davis accidentally shot himself in the leg with his Sig Sauer P320 X-Carry pistol while getting out of his truck. Davis claimed the gun was fully holstered and that he did not pull the trigger. He alleged that the P320 was defectively designed, making it prone to accidental discharge, and that alternative designs could have prevented his injury. Davis filed a products-liability lawsuit against Sig Sauer under Kentucky law, citing strict liability and negligence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Sig Sauer’s motions to exclude Davis’s expert witnesses and for summary judgment. The court found that Davis’s experts, James Tertin and Dr. William J. Vigilante, Jr., did not investigate the exact circumstances of the shooting and thus could not opine on causation. Without expert testimony, the court held that Davis could not pursue his products-liability claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the experts’ opinions on causation but reversed the exclusion of their testimonies on design defects and reasonable alternative designs. The appellate court found that the experts’ opinions were admissible to prove that the P320 was defectively designed and that reasonable alternative designs existed. The court held that Davis had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the P320 was defectively designed and caused his injury. Consequently, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

A minor, L.W., suffered severe injuries when an Audi Q7, allegedly defective, surged forward and crushed him against a garage wall. L.W., his mother, and two siblings filed a products liability suit against Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (VWGoA), claiming the vehicle lacked necessary safety features. Audi AG, a German company, manufactures vehicles sold in the U.S. through VWGoA, which markets and sells them to authorized dealerships, including in California.The Superior Court of Placer County granted Audi's motion to quash service of summons, finding no personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Audi's purposeful availment of California's market or a substantial connection between Audi's activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable or consistent with fair play and substantial justice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Audi, through VWGoA, deliberately served the U.S. market, including California, and thus could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in California. The court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating Audi's purposeful availment and the relatedness of the controversy to Audi's contacts with California. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction over Audi would be fair and reasonable, given California's significant interest in providing a forum for its residents and enforcing safety regulations.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to quash and remanded the case with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "L.W. v. Audi AG" on Justia Law