Trascher v. Territo

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by Justia Inc
In March 2007, Plaintiff Joseph Trascher filed a petition in the district court seeking an ex parte order to perpetuate his testimony, alleging that he had been diagnosed with asbestosis in August 2006, and that it was unlikely that he would survive more than another six months. Plaintiff also alleged he sustained occupational exposures to asbestos while working as a tack welder at the Avondale Shipyard from 1960 to 1964, and at the Equitable Shipyard from 1965-1974. He requested service on these parties and a number of other parties he identified as expected defendants in his anticipated suit for damages.The district court granted the ex parte order and the videotaped perpetuation deposition was scheduled for April 3, 2007, at Plaintiff's home. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court concerned the admissibility of the video deposition where the deposition was halted due to the deponent’s failing health and fatigue, and the deponent died before his deposition could be continued and before he could be cross-examined by opposing counsel. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found that while most of the video deposition was inadmissible, parts of the deposition were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.

Empire Abrasive Equipment Corp. v. Morgan

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by Justia Inc
Henry Morgan, Sr. filed a personal-injury suit against eighty-eight defendants, claiming injuries related to silicosis. Morgan, Sr., died while the personal-injury case was pending, and the case eventually was dismissed. More than three years after Morgan, Sr.'s death, his son, Henry Morgan, Jr., filed a wrongful-death suit individually and on behalf of all wrongful-death beneficiaries of Morgan, Sr. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. Because the wrongful-death suit was filed more than three years after the death of Morgan, Sr., the statute of limitations barred any wrongful-death and survival claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of the defendants.

Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp.

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by Justia Inc
The named plaintiffs are Ohio residents who purchased front-loading washing machines manufactured by defendant. Within months after their purchases, the plaintiffs noticed the smell of mold or mildew emanating from the machines and from laundry washed in the machines. One plaintiff found mold growing on the sides of the detergent dispenser, another saw mold growing on the rubber door seal, despite allowing the machine doors to stand open. They filed suit, alleging tortious breach of warranty, negligent design, and negligent failure to warn. The district court certified a class comprised of Ohio residents who purchased one of the specified machines in Ohio primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and not for resale (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification, with proof of damages reserved for individual determination. Plaintiffs’ proof established numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. Common questions predominate over individual ones and class action is a superior method to adjudicate the claims.

Stone v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.

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by Justia Inc
Plaintiffs sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 300aa, for injuries to their children allegedly caused by the Diptheria-Tetanus-acellular Pertussis vaccine. The children suffer a seizure disorder, known as Severe Myoclonic Epilepsy of Infancy. The same special master presided over both cases and determined that plaintiffs failed to show entitlement to compensation because evidence showed that a gene mutation present in both children was the sole cause of their injuries. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting considerable evidentiary support for the conclusion.

Stark v. Ford Motor Co.

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by Justia Inc
A couple and their boy and girl were riding in the family's Ford Taurus when the car began to accelerate rapidly and slammed into a light pole. The children received serious injuries. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued Ford Motor Company, claiming that the Taurus's seat belt system caused their enhanced injuries. After evidence was presented showing the children's father placed the girl's seatbelt behind her back, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ford. At issue on appeal was the product alteration or modification defense provided to manufacturers and sellers in products liability actions by N.C. Gen. Stat. 99-B-3. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict on Ford's affirmative defense under section 99B-3, reasoning that section 99B-3 gives a manufacturer or seller no defense when the product modifier is not a party to the action at the time of trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not limit the use of this defense to those occasions when the one who alters or modifies the product is a party to the action at the time of trial. Remanded.

In re: Quigley Company, Inc.

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by Justia Inc
This case required the court to address the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over suits against non-debtor third parties, as well as the scope of a stay issued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(4). Pfizer and Quigley appealed from a judgment in the district court reversing the Clarifying Order of the bankruptcy court and holding that the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (Angelos) could bring suit against Pfizer for claims based on "apparent manufacturer" liability under Pennsylvania law. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue the Clarifying Order; and that the Clarifying Order did not bar Angelos from bringing the suits in question against Pfizer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Schwering v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc.

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by Justia Inc
Kenneth Schwering and his wife were driving a Ford when they were involved in a traffic accident. Schwering's wife was killed and Schwering was injured. Both were wearing their seatbelts. Schwering filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company and TRW Safety Systems, asserting products-liability and negligence claims. After the case proceeded to a jury trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial. Before the second trial began, Schwering filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 41(A)(1)(a). Schwering subsequently filed a lawsuit in the U.S. district court, asserting the same claims against the same defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss the federal action, arguing that Schwering's voluntary dismissal of the state action did not occur "before the commencement of trial" as required by Rule Civ. R. 41(A)(1)(a), and thus the dismissal could not have been "without prejudice." The Supreme Court accepted certification from the U.S. district court and held that a plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(A)(1)(a) when a trial court declares a mistrial after the jury has been empaneled and trial has commenced.

Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp.

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by Justia Inc
While working for plaintiff, Hashman was standing in the open compartment, driving a forklift manufactured by Raymond when she either fell or stepped from the open side of the compartment. Her foot was trapped. She suffered severe injuries resulting in partial amputation. After settling Hashman's workers' compensation claim, plaintiff sought subrogation from Raymond, claiming that a design defect, failure to include a rear guard door on the forklift, caused the injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for Raymond, finding that plaintiff could not sustain a design defect claim without expert testimony and that the methods of its proposed expert were not sufficiently reliable to support the proffered opinions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There were at least four problems with the expert's methodology: anecdotal evidence, improper extrapolation, failure to consider other possible causes, and lack of testing. Although plaintiff could argue a "consumer expectations" theory without expert testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim.

Beard v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.

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by Justia Inc
This appeal arose out of a medical-device product liability action in which a strict liability, design-defect theory was asserted. Given that the surgical instrument at issue was said to have multiple applications, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the trial court's threshold risk-utility analysis should have been limited to the particular one alleged to have caused the decedent harm. Additionally, the appeal was allowed to consider the degree to which an appellate court is bound by such weight and credibility determinations as may be made by a trial court in a risk-utility assessment. The decedent Sandra Selepec, underwent gastric bypass surgery in August 2002. The surgeon used a product manufactured by Appellee Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. known as an ETS-Flex45 Articulating Endoscopic Linear Cutter, or an "endocutter." Appellee also marketed its product as being useful in more traditional surgery, in which larger incisions are made to expose organs to open view and accessibility. Mrs. Selepec's surgery was of this latter kind. During recovery, Mrs. Selepec experienced complications, and surgeons reentered her abdomen to discover that two of the bypass staples failed. On the merits, Appellee argued that courts applying the risk-utility analysis have always considered the risks, benefits, and design constraints associated with all intended uses of a product; to artificially limit the risk utility analysis to the particular use to which a plaintiff put a product in a particular case would be to ignore the inherent, essential characteristics that informed the design; and to hold multi-use products to the same standard as single-use products would be tantamount to requiring the sale of multiple single-use products, which would be inefficient and impractical, if not impossible. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that trial courts are not restricted to considering a single use of a multiuse product in design defect, threshold, risk-utility balancing. The Court also declined to disturb the Superior Court's legal determination as to the appropriate risk-utility calculus.

Linden, Jr. v. CNH America

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by Justia Inc
Plaintiff filed a products liability action against CNH based on injuries he sustained while operating a CNH-manufactured bulldozer. A jury returned a verdict in favor of CNH and defendant appealed. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the manufacturing defect claims where plaintiff had not pointed to sufficient evidence in the record that would support his claim that the product manufactured by CNH "departed from its intended design" and did not meet its "design specifications." The court also held that there was no error in the jury instructions regarding the "sophisticated user," "premature wear" instruction, "safety code" instruction, and "manufacturer expert in its field" instruction. Finally, because plaintiff was unable to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's dismissal of a prospective juror, the jury verdict must be upheld. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.